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A Reply to Professor Ball
Philip Bobbitt*
I.

Although it has been observed that approaching an allegedly
universalistic theory by asserting the time- and culture-bound nature of
that theory is an attack of some sort,' Professor Ball does not take my
lectures to be a rebuke to the enterprise in which he, Professor Tushnet,
and others are engaged. Instead, he complains that I do not examine
the relation between constitutional argument, on the one hand, and, on
the other, social, political, and economic interests.2 This is a mistaken
reading of my work. It is nice to be told that Tushnet and Ball accept
my formulation "that in our theories are our fates" and that they go on
from there, but if they really accepted my formulation they would accept the bankruptcy of "going on from there." For the point the formulation tries to achieve is that theoretical requirements have driven
law; that judicial review is legitimated by these theoretical moves and
not by what are thought to be more fundamental social and class motives; that the vocabulary of social and economic interest is itself just
one more set of theoretical conventions, and, indeed, one of little relevance to constitutional decisionmaking; that the constitutional types of
argument are not determined by political and economic theory.
It is interesting that Professor Ball (and others) assume that all
boundaries and restraints are unintended, or at least are intended for
purposes partly obscured, and that true causes can be found in sociopolitical constructions. Given this general view, it perhaps is to be expected that my painstaking efforts to clarify my lectures so that their
outlines would clearly demark what was not being said should now be
seen as a hopeless mask for a failure to do the really important work.
My lectures were written for those in sympathy with their spirit.
*
Professor of Law, The University of Texas (on leave); currently serving as Visiting Research Fellow, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. A.B. 1971, Princeton
University; J.D. 1975, Yale University.
1. Duncanson, Legal Positivism as Ideology, LONDON L. REv. 20 (1978).
2. Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote: A Response andAlternative to Tushnet, Bobbitt, and the
Revised Texas Version of ConstitutionalLaw, 59 TEXAS L. REv. 787 (1981). Professor Ball cor-

rectly observes that his affinity lies with Professor Tushnet's work and not with mine, and yet I
suspect that this is, rhetorically, a marriage of convenience-a term once defined as occurring
when a couple shares the same bed but dreams different dreams.
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This is not the spirit of the current vogue in American constitutional
philosophy, which seems to believe that law is in need of a foundation
constructed from political theory. I am not interested in constructing
such a foundation, but instead in having a perspicuous view of the
3
structures that make justification possible. To this aim Tragic Choices
is directed; and so alsc5 ConstitutionalFate.4 The latter explicitly discards the notion that law takes place within a framework independent
of the structure of legal argument itself. It rejects the view that there
exists a set of legal presuppositions that are discoverable in the absence
of legal argument, upon which such argument is supposed to depend.
The entire enterprise in which Tushnet and Ball and others are engaged seems to me based on a confusion between the justification for
judicial review-which is the legitimation that results from the operation of the various conventions discussed in my lectures-and a hypothesized causal explanation for such review derived from sociopolitical theories. Those engaged in this enterprise believe that such
theories exist on a privileged plane and are not simply other stylized
moves within another convention-bound and largely irrelevant game.
Because the justification offered by the operation of constitutional
argument does not even purport to rely on such a causal account, it will
not be satisfying to those who suffer from the confusion I have described. At the same time, those who do offer such general causal theories will often be tempted to derive what are erroneously thought to be
independent justifications from them.
I have presented constitutional law as a set of relations to argument. Accordingly, justification is that relation of legitimation among
arguments advanced by advocates and other arguments from which the
former may be inferred (e.g., precedent, the text of the Constitution,
and so forth). By contrast, one might think of the legitimation of constitutional law as a special state occurring when law and argument bear
a certain relationship to social facts (or metaphysical ones) that are
thought to underlie law. If we accept the approach I have offered, we
will not feel the need to ground the potentially infinite series of arguments brought forward in support of other arguments: the very functioning of the argumentative models works to ensure that there is
consensus among those persons operating within the conventions. But
if we think of law in the second way, we will want to get behind arguments to causes. If we are captivated by this picture of law, we shall
want to escape the argumentative structure to find causation from so3. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGic CHOICES (1978).
4. P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (forthcoming).
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cial facts, measuring our arguments against the social or political realities that are thought to account for them in the first place. By this
means it is thought that we may arrive at a situation in which further
argument is not simply unnecessary but impossible, since an accurate
appreciation of the social facts will determine the correct conclusion.
This latter view accounts for Professor Ball's enthusiasm for the "self' 5
evident truth of a political reality characterized by equality of care
and for Professor Tushnet's interest in "the incomplete hegemony of
the ruling class." '6 It is a view rejected, not simply ignored, in my work,
as the student editor whom Professor Ball disparages clearly saw and as
others, I fear, have not. To reiterate: it was my purpose to show that
superimposing political theories on the doctrine of judicial review does
not account for the doctrine and cannot offer a justification for it.
II.
Beyond the observation that my work is lacking in "reality-transcending elements,"'7 there are many descriptions of my lectures in Professor Ball's article. Not all of these are wholly accurate.
Professor Ball writes,
Professor Philip Bobbitt discerns certain patterns in constitutional law which he organizes into categories of arguments. Because each kind of argument is associated with the choice of
particular justification for judicial review, the typology of arguments gives rise to a typology of related functions. For example,
historical argument belongs with a checking function for the
courts; structural argument with a legitimating function. In addition to the five received categories Bobbitt identifies a sixth, ethifor judicial review, the
cal argument, with its
8 related justification
expressive function.
If the second sentence of this passage is to be taken as summarizing my
views, rather than as proposing some causal correlation between justification, function, and argument, it is wrong. The typology of arguments
does not, in my view, give rise to a typology of functions; one can easily
imagine a judicial system that used these sorts of arguments in service
of completely different functions. Furthermore, the various functions
discussed in the lectures-checking, expressive, cueing, referring, legiti5. Ball, supra note 2, at 810.
6. Id. at 791; Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretationof Public
Law Scholarshp in the Seventies, 57 TExAS L. Rav. 1307, 1346 (1979).

7. Ball, supra note 2, at 793.
8. Id. at 788 (footnotes omitted) (Because this reply was written in response to an earlier
draft of Professor Ball's article, several quotations vary slightly from the published versions cited
here.).
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mating-are not names for various justifications, as the last.sentence in
the quoted paragraph suggests; nor do the lectures anywhere assert that
a particular argument "belongs" with a particular function.9 Rather
the lectures make the point that our appreciation of the functions of
Supreme Court decisions is often enabled by the approaches we adopt
among the typology of arguments. 10 Thus, structuralists are apt to call
attention to the legitimating function, prudentialists to the remanding
function, and so on. Whether one thinks a particular function is actualized depends then on the possibilities created by the argumentative
conventions. This does not mean that a particular function is served
only by a particular argument or that the argumentative conventions
are neatly paired with various functions.
Professor Ball is nonplussed by my treatment of what I have perhaps misleadingly termed 'ethical' argument. He writes,
At times Bobbitt seems to mean that ethical argument is but one
of several equally valid forms of argument which can be isolated
and identified in legal arguments and Court opinions, ie., a
patch of text. At other times it appears that he is asking us not so
much to look at a bit of text as at the white sheet underneath
(agreeing with the results of some cases but finding they are
wrongly explained and would be better re-drafted as ethical arguments), or at some object which lies behind the page and exerts
a gravitational pull upon the writer. Also Bobbitt seems to present ethical argument as but one of several equally valid forms
but then identifies it with the cases which "engage [students] the
most."1 1
I should say at once that I not only "seem to mean," "appear to ask,"
and "seem to present," but do actually mean, ask, and present the
points suspected. Furthermore, I will continue to do so. For there is
nothing inconsistent in saying that ethical argument, or for that matter
any of the forms of arguments, is but one of several possibly valid
types; that it can sometimes be found in court opinions and at other
times in law reviews or in classes which urge a different approach from
the one chosen by the court; and that even when not explicitly relied
upon in an opinion, it can nevertheless be decisive in the decisionmaking that precedes opinion-writing. I also continue to think that ethical
arguments are associated with the cases that engage the emotional and
political commitments of my students.
Professor Ball implies that I hold the view that the state's refusal to
9. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TExAs L. REv. 695, 767 (1980) (The Dougherty
Lectures).
10. Id. at 756-57.

11. Ball, supra note 2, at 789 n.13.
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subsidize abortions is coercion to carry to term. This is not my view.12
Rather, I have said that criminalizing abortions is a form of state coercion that forces a pregnant woman to give birth. Although this distinction is hardly minor, I would not draw attention to the correction but
for the fact that it perhaps reveals the basis for the absurd reconstruction of my argument on Roe v. Wade. 13 Professor Ball's reconstruction
is:
The issue can be stated, A la Bobbitt, as follows: Ours is a limited
government. Its choices are confined. One essential limitation is
that government may not refuse to protect the lives, health,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Government may also
not withhold due process of law from a person to be deprived of
life nor deny to any person the equal protection of law. Government has no choice in these things. The choice is especially circumscribed when the person involved has no voice in
government or depends upon government for a voice. If an embryonic form is a child, and Bobbitt refers to the fetus as both,
then he or she is a person from whom the government is powerless to withhold the protection of law. The14critical decision to be
made is Whether a human life is at stake.
I am not certain how close a resemblance to my own analysis the
phrase "Ala Bobbitt" is intended to convey. But if there is any chance
that any reader will conclude that Professor Ball has applied my approach to the Roe problem, I should correct that impression.
When I wrote that the state governments are constrained in their
choices by constitutional restrictions that originally could have been
derived from the negative implications of limited, affirmative grants of
power to the federal government, I did not mean to suggest that federal
or state governments "may not refuse to protect the lives, health, safety,
and general welfare of the people," 15 nor that "[g]overnment has no
choice in these things," 1 6 nor that this lack of choice is "especially circumscribed when the person involved has no voice in government or
depends on government for a voice." 17 This view, these opinions, have
no foundation whatsoever in my lectures.
Indeed, the quoted passage above ignores my analysis and replaces
it with a bizarre caricature in which limitations on the means that a
12. Indeed, the fact that a refusal to provide abortions may, from some perspectives, be the
moral equivalent of criminalizing them simply underscores the distinction between moral argument and constitutional argument
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Ball, supra note 2, at 790.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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state may choose to further an unlimited set of goals are transmuted
into affirmative state obligations. The caricature ignores my construction of the privileges and immunities clause and the ninth and tenth
amendment restraints, from which "ethical" arguments take form, in
favor of lifting the derived construction and placing it as a gloss on the
grants of due process and equal protection. This permits Professor Ball
to introduce the familiar assertions regarding the affirmative requirements of these clauses. Whatever these requirements may be, I hope it
is obvious that this superimposition has nothing to do with the approach proposed in my lectures. As a collateral response to Bal's argument in this context-parts of which, e.g., "when the person involved
depends on government for a voice," are obscure-I should think one
need only consider a great many laws that might tend to protect human
life that the Constitution would not permit the state to enforce: for
example, statutes providing for the detention without trial of terrorists
such as those currently in force in Northern Ireland.
Finally, Professor Ball concludes, "Indeed one has the feeling that
for Bobbitt the perfect marriage of expressive function and ethical argument drawn from the limitedness of government would be the total
silence of the courts."1 8 Readers who are unfamiliar with the lectures
would perhaps be perplexed to learn that my discussions of ethical argument focus on a series of cases in which courts have acted quite vigorously to upset legislative acts and executive practices, and that my
criticism of these cases extended only to their failure to offer forthright
and convincing rationales-namely, ones using ethical, constitutional
argument.19
III.
Two kinds of activity remain to be done in constitutional law.
First, there is the ongoing "normal science," the exchange of arguments
within the conventions I have discussed, the game of scissors/paper/stone with its circular hierarchy that brings different values
to decisive but momentary preeminence before being replayed. To this
the law reviews, the professional lives of the members of the bar, and
the intellectual energies of our judges are devoted.
Second, there will be essays depicting individuals and societies responding to the theoretical requirements of the legal conceptions with
which they have to cope. These essays, whether historicist or anthropo18. Id. at 790 n.19.
19. See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 9, at 731, 732, 733-49, 750.
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logical or economic, may show theories working through the actions of
individuals or institutions, but they will not purport to offer meta-theoties about the basis of law in political philosophy. Such essays, even if
fictive, can heighten our awareness of the force field of constitutional
law and will, by their example, rid us of the illusion that a social or
theological mechanics explains our constitutional life.
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